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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
NEW YORK PRACTICE-CITY COURT HAS JURISDICTION THOUGH
AGGREGATE OF SEPARATE CLAIMS EXCEEDS $6,000.-Upon a negli-
gence action brought in the City Court, plaintiff alleged two separate
causes of action, one for personal injuries in which he demanded
damages of $6,000, the other for property damages, wherein he de-
manded $1,148.40. The defendant in his answer asserted as an
affirmative defense that the amounts demanded were in excess of the
$6,000 monetary jurisdictional limitation of the court. The trial
court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike out the defense. On
appeal, the Appellate Term held that the City Court has jurisdiction
when a plaintiff alleges several causes of action in his complaint, and
the demand in each cause of action alleged does not exceed $6,000,
though the aggregate exceeds $6,000. Jordan v. Ravitz, - Misc. 2d
-, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1959).
The jurisdiction of the City Court 1 is specified in the New York
Constitution 2 and in the New York City Court Act.3 Its monetary
jurisdiction is limited to cases where the amount involved does not
exceed $6,000 and interest.4 Jurisdiction of the court in actions for
a sum of money only, is determined by the amount demanded in the
complaint. 5 Hence, it has no authority to entertain an action unless
1 The territorial jurisdiction of the City Court extends throughout the
City of New York, Hollywood Garage Corp. v. Petis & Co., 169 Misc. 906,
9 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1938), but is limited thereto, N.Y. CoD.-sT. art. VI,
§ 15. Appeals from the New York City Court are taken to the Appellate
Term of the First and Second Departments, N.Y.C. CT. AcT § 56.
2"The City Court of the City of New York ... shall have ... original
jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme court in actions for the recovery of
money only in which the complaint demands judgment for a sum not exceeding
six thousand dollars, and interest." N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 15.
3 N.Y.C. CT. Acr § 16.
4 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 15, as amended, Jan. 1, 1952. The 1952 amend-
ment enlarged the jurisdiction of the N.Y. City Court from $3,000 to $6,000.
Within this monetary limitation, it has jurisdiction of actions for the re-
covery of money only. Except with respect to actions to foreclose a mechanic's
lien, and a lien on personal property, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 15, it has no
equitable jurisdiction other than as to equitable defenses. It has, however,jurisdiction, unlimited in amount, of marine causes, and of counterclaims.
N.Y.C. CT. AcT §§ 16(5), 17, 18.
5 Latimer v. Barker Bros. Painting Corp., 68 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1947). Where the amount claimed in the complaint, served with the
summons, exceeds the monetary limitation, the defect cannot be cured by
amendment and the City Court has no jurisdiction. McConnell v. Williams
S.S. Co., 239 App. Div. 393, 267 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd enem.,
265 N.Y. 594, 193 N.E. 336 (1934). Where the summons recited the sum
of $6,000, but the complaint alleged an amount in excess of $6,000, and the
summons and complaint were served simultaneously, the court lacked juris-
diction from the inception of the action. Bergman v. Prestige Records, Inc.,
134 N.Y.L.J. No. 82, p. 11, col. 2 (N.Y. City Ct. Oct. 27, 1955). Service
of summons alone (by which the court acquired jurisdiction) demanding no
amount, followed by notice of appearance and later by service of complaint
demanding judgment for $25,000, was held to be reducible to the monetary
limitation in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Ussop v. American
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it appears on the face of the complaint that the judgment demanded
is within the jurisdictional monetary limitation.6 Where the amount
demanded in the complaint, served with the summons, exceeds the
monetary limitation, the defect cannot be cured by amendment, for
in such a case, the court, never having acquired jurisdiction, is with-
out the power to allow the amendment.7 Where several parties join
as plaintiffs,8 because of common questions of law or fact involved,
and each plaintiff separately states his cause of action, and demands
a separate judgment in an amount not exceeding $6,000, the City
Court has jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the aggregate
demands of the plaintiffs are in excess of $6,000. For each plaintiff's
complaint, in such a case, is that portion of the complaint which
states his cause of action and his demand for judgment.9 However,
where several plaintiffs demand a joint judgment, exceeding the
monetary limitation, the court has no jurisdiction.' 0 In the event
that a single plaintiff joins several defendants in one action, where
the amount demanded against each is within the monetary limitation,
the City Court again has jurisdiction."'
Many cases have adhered to the reasoning that where there is
but a single plaintiff and defendant in an action, the total amount
demanded in the complaint is the test of jurisdiction,12 notwith-
standing the fact that the plaintiff alleges several causes of action.
In Marcus v. Bader,13 the plaintiff alleged two causes of action for
slander. Each demand was within the court's monetary limitation.
The court construed the word "judgment" in the New York State
Constitution 14 to mean the total amount sought by one plaintiff and
refused to entertain the suit. The court stated:
West African Line, 151 Misc. 12, 269 N.Y. Supp. 654 (N.Y. City Ct. 1934);
accord, Murlock v. Hansen, 130 N.Y.L.J. No. 121, p. 1544, col. 8 (N.Y. City
Ct. Dec. 23, 1953). If upon the trial the plaintiff's proof shows that he is
entitled to more than the jurisdictional amount, he may waive or remit that
part of his claim and thus keep the amount within the statutory limitation.
Latimer v. Barker Bros. Painting Corp., supra.
6Heffron v. Jennings, 66 App. Div. 443, 73 N.Y. Supp. 410 (4th Dep't
1901).7 McConnell v. Williams S.S. Co., mtpra note 5.
8 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 212 for the provisions concerning the joinder
of parties.9 Merten v. Queen Rental Corp., 241 App. Div. 831, 271 N.Y. Supp. 271(2d Dep't 1934) (per curiam); Spetler v. Jogel Realty Co., 224 App. Div.
612, 231 N.Y. Supp. 517 (1st Dep't 1928). (These cases were decided before
the City Court's monetary jurisdiction was raised to $6,000.)
10 Weis v. Richartz, 130 Misc. 583, 224 N.Y. Supp. 416 (N.Y. City Ct.
1927).
"'Farkas v. Metz. 160 Misc. 9, 289 N.Y. Supp. 214 (N.Y. City Ct. 1936).
12 See, e.g.. Malkin v. La Boutique Sportswear, Inc., 140 N.Y.L.J. No. 36,
p. 2. col. 7 (N.Y. City Ct. Aug. 20, 1958); Rodriguez v. Coras Taxi, Inc., 133
N.Y.L.J. No. 26, p. 10, col. 7 (N.Y. City Ct. Feb. 7, 1955); Marcus v.
Bader. 156 Misc. 730, 282 N.Y. Supp. 503 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935).
'a Note 12 supra.14 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
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The complaint always consists of, first, a statement setting forth one or
more causes of action; and, second, a prayer for judgment. The purpose of
joining two or more causes of action in a single complaint is that all matters
of difference between plaintiff and defendant may be determined in one action.
The same reason exists for joining two or more plaintiffs in one complaint.
In the latter case, however, each plaintiff who so joins in a single complaint
in an action brought in this court is entitled to demand therein a separate
judgment on his cause of action for an amount within the limits of this
court's jurisdiction. His statement as to his cause of action is, as to him,
his complaint, separate and distinct from the others who joined in the same
complaint. At bar, there is but one plaintiff, one complaint, one action, and
there can, therefore, be but one judgment. It is true that where two or more
plaintiffs join in the one complaint, pursuant to section 209 [now section 212]
of the Civil Practice Act, there is but one action, but the distinguishing
feature between that situation and the one at bar is, that in the former in-
stance there are several plaintiffs in the one action each entitled to have his
cause of action treated as a separate complaint.1 5
In the recent case of Malkin v. La Boutique Sportswear, Inc.,1
the court recognized the financial hardships placed upon the plaintiff
but construed a complaint, wherein several causes of action were
stated, to be in conflict with the constitutional limitation upon the
monetary jurisdiction of the City Court. In Rodriguez v. Coras
Taxi, Inc.,17 where the court denied plaintiff's motion to amend his
complaint so as to state two causes of action, the court took cogni-
zance of the procedural anomaly that allows the monetary limitation
to be disregarded in "joinder of parties" cases, but relying on the
Bader case as authority, felt compelled to deny jurisdiction.
In the recent case of Robles v. Rushfield,'8 however, the court
assumed jurisdiction in a situation similar to that in the instant case,
thereby marking a radical departure from previous authority, basing
their reasoning on the favorable policy toward joinder of causes of
action,19 and the avoidance of a multiplicity of lawsuits. Not since
1928, when held by implication, has a court granted jurisdiction
under these circumstances. 20 The importance of the instant case is
that the Robles holding is solidified by appellate review.
The lower court in the Jordan case relied on the authority of
Dilworth v. Yellow Taxi Corp.,21 in which the court refused to grant
jurisdiction where several plaintiffs joined their causes of action and
the aggregate demand exceeded the court's monetary limitation. The
Appellate Term found that this is no longer the rule in the Second
15 Marcus v. Bader, 156 Misc. 730, 731-32, 282 N.Y. Supp. 503, 505 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1935).
16 Note 12 supra.
17 133 N.Y.L.J. No. 36, p. 2, col. 7 (N.Y. City Ct. Aug. 20, 1958).
1 7 Misc. 2d 734, 166 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957).
19 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 258.
20 See text accompanying note 23 infra.
21220 App. Div. 772, 221 N.Y. Supp. 813 (2d Dep't 1927) (mem. opinion).
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Department and has not been since 1934.22 The court ruled that
in the event a plaintiff alleges several causes of action and each is
within the monetary limitation, though the aggregate exceeds $6,000,
the City Court has jurisdiction. This appears to be the rule in the
First Department.23
The Court used reasoning similar to that of the Robles decision
when it declared that:
Inasmuch as the plaintiff in the instant action might have brought sep-
arate actions for personal injuries and property damage, demanding damages
in each up to the limit of the court's jurisdiction, and these cases might prop-
erly have been consolidated, there appears to be no reason . . . to hold that
the jurisdiction of the court was exceeded when the plaintiff joined two sep-
arate causes of action, separately stated, in one complaint and the demand in
each case was within the limit of the court's jurisdiction.24
The logic which recognizes the separability of the first pleading
in an action into as many distinct complaints as there are causes of
action, pleaded by multiple plaintiffs against one defendant 25 or by
one plaintiff against multiple defendants, 26 should apply with equal
force to the situation in hand where one plaintiff pleads distinctly
separate causes of action with separate demands, none in excess of
$6,000, against one defendant. The decision in the instant case is
consistent with the joinder provisions of the Civil Practice Act,27 in
that it avoids a multiplicity of suits 28 and promotes the speedy, con-
venient disposition in one action of all the claims of all parties in-
volving common questions of law and fact.
22 See Merten v. Queen Rental Corp., 241 App. Div. 831, 271 N.Y. Supp.
271 (2d Dep't 1934). See generally, 72 A.L.R. 193-224 (1931), for a dis-
cussion of the law concerning the criteria of jurisdictional amount where
several claimants are involved.
23 See Spetler v. Jogel Realty Co., 224 App. Div. 612, 231 N.Y. Supp. 517
(1st Dep't 1928). In the Spetler case, a husband, wife and son alleged four
causes of action arising out of a negligence case. Each demand was for the
maximum of the monetary limitation, which was then $3,000. Two of the
causes of action were alleged by the husband. The Appellate Division of the
First Department held that though the aggregate claims of all the plaintiffs
exceeded the monetary jurisdiction, the constitutional inhibition was not thereby
violated for the reason that the claim and amount demanded by each was
within the jurisdictional limit. Although the issue in the case revolved around
the effect of the joinder of parties on the monetary limitation of the City
Court (since the father did allege two causes of action), the court could have
on its own motion raised the issue; by not doing so, it impliedly held that the
monetary jurisdictional limitation was not infringed.
24 Jordan v. Ravitz, - Misc. 2d -, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (App. T. 2d
Dep't 1959).
25 See, e.g., Vigil v. Cayuga Const. Corp., 185 Misc. 675, 54 N.Y.S.2d 94
(N.Y. City Ct. 1945).
26 See, e.g., Farkas v. Metz, 160 Misc. 9, 289 N.Y. Supp. 214 (N.Y. City Ct.
1936).
27 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acv §§ 212, 258.
28 The decision is a step in the right direction toward alleviating the con-
gested court calendars in New York City today.
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